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Iri the Supreme CPurt
of the State of Utah
B. GRANT PO\VELL, who is · also
known as B. G. Powell, being one
--· and the same person, dba ROYAL
'} BLAZE CO. t\L
. CO.,

Plaintiff,

l

vs.

No: 7250

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 0 F )I
UTAH, Department-of Employment
Security,
·
.
·
D::fendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
B. Grant Powell, the plaintiff, in 1944 filed reports and
paid contributions on the earnings of individuals in his em ploy.
He failed to file reports subsequent to that period, and the Department of Employment Security of the Industrial Con1mission
of Utah, after investigation, issued an office determ-ination
pursuant to the provisions of Section 42 2a-14(b), Utah Code
Annotateq 1943. T~is determination was sent to t~e appellant
under the,date of November 13,._1947, and coyered the p~riod

.3
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commencing with: the 4th quarter of 1944 and endi~g with the
3rd quarter of 1947. The total amount of contribution as
shown on the determination was $1,589.03 plus interest in the
amount of $77.81 and penalties in the amount of $34j.26.
The appellant disagreed with this determination and on
November 14, 1947, filed a written appeal. The tnatter was
referred to the Appeals Referee on November 20, 1947, and on
January 5, 1948, he directed written notices to the parties designating the time and place of hearing on the appeal. The matter
was heard before the Referee on January 15, 1948, and at a
continuation on April 22, 1948. At each of these hearings the
appellant and the Department of Employment Security of the
Industrial Commission of Utah were properly represented. On
the 29th day of April 1948 the Appeals Tribunal issued its
findings and decision wherein it found that the appellant was
an employer during the period covered by the original determination and that as such he owed unemployment compensation
contributions in the sum of $872.74, together with interest 1n
the amount of $56.33 and penalties in the sum of $218.19.
On the 8th day of May 1948 B. Grant Powell, through his
attorney, Thorit Hatch, filed with the Industrial Commtssion of
Utah an appeal from the decision of the Appeals Referee. On
the 16th day of September 1948, the Industrial Commission of
Utah issued its decision on the appeal in \vhich it stated that
the Commission, «tacting within the authority granted Hnder the
Employment Security Act sustains the decision of the 1\ppeals
Tribunal and denies any further hearing."
On the 11th day of October the appellant filed an affidavit
and application for writ of review with the Supreme Court of

4.
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-U.tah, ..an~ ·on the l-ith day of:Oct~ber. 1948.; -the cou-rt issued
the .\\Vrit of revie\v. . .·..: .. :.
.1.

:

i\'·

· .- , : g

,

~ .r

n fO. ,.;

S1.ATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1941_the appell~nt, B. Grant Powell, too~ possess1on _of
certain potential coal property to which his wife had titl~ and
~egan development .'vork.

He did most of this. work hif11:~elf,
including the building of the road and the clearing of_ th.~ oyerburden together with installing of track an~ equipment ~qr
the purpose of producing coal.

I ,

~ rt(.

;

During the 3rd quarter of 1944 the appellant con1n1enced
operations of the· mine under the name Royal· Blaze Coal Company. In the 4th quarter of that year the appellant entered into
an oral agreement with one Jim Cruthis (Tr. :s) ~ Under-this
agreement Cruthis Vlas to be paid $1.50-per ton of coal ''delivered in the bins., Cruthis \Vas to pay for, (out of this $1. 50)'
the po,vder and caps which he used. Powell. was to furnjsh 'the
rock dust, tim_ber, rails, fuel oil, horses, feed: for· the horses,
housing, etc. During this -period most of the coal :which \Vas
mined was sold at the mine to truckers, the s_ales being generally
consummated by Cruthis who turned all of the money resulting
from the sales over to Powell, except at c~rtain tjm~ he withheld
for hir:1self $1.50 per ton (Tr. 7). It is evident thaJ Cruthis
did not ahvays vvithhold the $1._50 since_P<;>well's. r.~co,~ds shq~v
that at tip1es he pai4 him as~high as $150-.QO.for coal._miqcd
and placed in the bins~ ..iu,
Ji .,, ; .

- '·

.-!~·~,u:.'j~> . ~;.;,·,,._.

~ ,:~

1 ,.

From the 4th quarter ef 1944 until the O'Neils 'Otl1.incnccd

. the.perform.ance .o.f the mining .function .in Sep.t~rnb~r

o_C 19,46,

._, 5
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there· \vas. a: succession of. oral. agreements involving a number
of different so-called lessees. It appears that their ·operations
\vere substantially the same in that the miners were to furnish
their own powder and caps and do all the work necessary in
mining coal, and the appellant was to furnish all other material
and equipment and to keep the equipment in repair. During
these periods the appellant inspected the mine at intervals.
· As the production of coal began to increase and the coal
was not all sold at the bins to truckers, Powell entered into oral
agreements with certain truck owners who agreed to haul the
coal from the mine to the railroad for shipment to the appellant's customers. It must be noted that the fluctuations in
Powell's sale price of the coal had no effect on the per-ton rate
established for placing the coal in the bins. The record sho,vs
that to some extent at least the individuals engaged in mining
the coal under the oral or lease agreements also assisted 1n loading the coal from the bins to the trucks and that they were paid
for that service in addition to their $1.50 per ton for placing the
coal in the bins. It appears that Powell had a number of regular customers to whom he sold coal and some of his sales were
made under contracts.
It \vill be noted that in the first written agreement, 'vhich
was entered into between Powell and the O'N eils, the lessor
agrees to furnish machinery and equipment only, however, the
testimony shows that it was also agreed that he would furnish
rock dust, timber, rails, etc.
The provision providing for Workmen's Compensation
coverage and the arrangement pursuant thereto was entered
·into as the result of a request made by the O'Neils ('fr. 16).
6
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The .. Wor~eU:s Compensation .policy
name. . .·.

Wt\S

carried iq Po\ve.lFs

.

'

:Richard O'Neii testified (Tr. 43) that while Powell didt:·t
. do .the actual work he did a lot of directing.. The O'Neils \Vere
paid $35.00 for each stoppi~1g in addition to their $1,-~0 per
ton (T r . .:i-1). The record shows that a~ least during the time
the O'Neils \Vere there, Powell was, during a major percentage
of the time, operating the tipple while two· of the O'Neils
loaded coal. When he \vould ((catch up" with the O'Neils, he
too would load coal (Tr. 47).
During the period covered by the agreement between
Po\vell and Elmer Babcock and LeRoy Safley (Appellant's. Exhibit 8) the state mine inspector ordered Powell to install a
certified mine foreman (Tr. 22). As a result_ one J-Iarwo~d
(Harward) was engaged to act as foreman and as such he- directed mine operations. It must be noted that there 1s no
indication that Harwood was a party to the contract.
As mine operations expanded the appellant _added such
things as cutting machines, a locomotive, generators, scales,
etc. After the scales were installed, the men were requtred to
keep weigh slips and turn them in to Powell together "'-ith the
money collected from truckers. During a great proportion of the
. tin1e Powell himself was engaged in hauling coal from the mine
to the rallroad. Powell. was required by the Ta~ Commission to
·. · -:
report and pay sales tax in his own n~me (Tr. 37')'.
.

.

~

.

'

~.. :)0\s; ·Babcock .. and; _Safley_ who ·perform~d . se-rvice~. purs,uf!nt.. to

appellant's _ExhibitB, \\'-ere p:ut on r_egl1lar paydays_ (Tr. ~-1) apd
.:.- 7
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· the :contract agreem~ntrequired .that they work" a six-day week
and deliver a minimum of 200 tons of coal per day in the bins.

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT

I.
THE COMMISSION ACTED PURSUAl'rT TO EXPRESS
STATUTORY AUTHORITY.
The plaintiff, quoting fron1 this court's decision in the case
of the National Tunnel & Mines Corporation vs. Industrial
Commission, 99 Utah 39; 102 Pac. 2nd 508, contends that the
Industrial Commission, through its Department of Employment
~ecurity, is without power or jurisdiction to determine the question of whether an alleged employer is liable for contribution
to the Fund.
Quoting from that decision the plaintiff refers to that decision wherein the court says:
CCThe Tax Commission is specifically charged \Vtth the
responsibility of collecting the tax and when someone
·defaults then the Tax Commission is to start a civil
action:'
The Employment Security Act as it existed in 19·40 v.1hen
the National Tunnel & Mines case, supra, was decided, contained provisions to the effect that the Tax Commisston was
specifically charged with the duty of collecting unemployment
compensation contributions. Section 9 (c) at that time specifically provided that: .

. 8
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~.).:•_,~ . ~~'~:.nThe:

State Tax Commission shall collect all contributions- ~tnder this .,.~ct.,~ .

and Section 14 (b) provided:

ulf, after due notice any etnployer ~efaults in any paytnent of contributions or interest thereon, the amount
due shall be collected by civil action in the natne of the
State Tax Con1mission .... "
The 1941 legislature amended the Employment Security
Act by enacting Chapter 40 as follows:
nSection 1--L Collection of Contributions.
"Unpaid Contributions to Bear Interest.
tt (a) ( 1) Contributions unpaid on the date Qn which
they are due and payable, as prescribed by the C(•n1mission, shall bear interest at the rate of one-half per cent
per month from and after such date until payment plus
accrued interest is received by the commission.
t'Id. Penalties.
t• ( 2) Contributions unpaid or contribution reports
not made and filed by the date on which they are due
as prescribed by the con1mission shall be subject to a
penalty to be assessed and collected in the same manner
as contributions due hereunder equal to twenty-five
per cent of their an1ount but not less than $2.)0 with
respect to each reporting period except that when a report is filed or a contribution is paid after such time and
it is shov.rn to the satisfaction of the commission or its
authorized representative that the failure to file or to
pay was due to a reasonable cause and not to_ wilful
neglect no such addition shall be made to the contrib~
tion.
.-,
3 )- -._Interest and penalties collected . in accC?,r.cl_ance
\Vith the -p-rovisionS of 'this sectio'ri shall be ·paid intO the
unemployment compensation fund.:. ·
C< (

-~:

9
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•

; .c~Failut?e tO- Report-Determination of Amounts Due.
· ·, ~·(b)· If an employer fails· to file a· report when pre. scribed hy. the commission for the. purpose of Jetermin.irig the amount of his contribution due under tnis act,
or if such report when filed is incorrect or insufficient,
or is· not satisfactory to,. the commission, the commission
bt its ·authorized representative ·may determine the
amount of wages paid for employmep.t during the period
or periods with respect to which the reports were or
should. have been made and the amount of contribution due from such employer on the basis of such information as it may be able to obtain, and it shall give
written notice of such determination to the employer.
Such determination shall .be deemed correct unless the
employer shall, within ten days after the mailing or
personal delivery of notice of such determination, apply
to the commission for a review of such determination
as provided in Section 10 of this act, or unless the con1mission · or its authorized representative of its own
motion shall review the same. The amount of contri- but.ion so detern1ined shall be subject to penalties and
interest as provided in Section 14 (a) of this act.
·.. Collection by Civil Suit.

.,

•

'( (c) If, after due notice, any employer defaults in any
payment of contributions, interest or penalties thereon,
the amount due shall be collectible by civil action in the
name of the commission, and the ·employer adjudged in
default shall pay the costs of such action. Civil actions
brought under this section to collect contributions, interest, or penalties thereon from an employer shall be
h~ard by the court at the earliest possible date and shall
be entitled to preference upon the calendar ,of the court
over all other civil actions except petitions for judicial
review under this act and cases arising under ~he \vorkmen' s com.pensatiop. law of this state .
~'Priorities-Under Insolvency Or· Bankruptcy Proceedings.
·· (d)- · In the event of any distribution of an employer's
·10
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puJ;"SUt\nt to an order. 9f any cou~t under the laws
·.of this st~te, including any rec.eivership, as~ignn1ent for
be~1efit$ of .:cr~itors, adjudicated insol:vency, corn position, or sin1ilar -proceeding, contributions then or there·
after due shall be paid in full prior to: alt other clain1s
except taxes and clain1s for w_ages:,of not more than
$400 to each clain1ant, earned within five months of the
con11nencement of the proceeding. . In the event of an
employer's adjudication in bankruptcy, judicially confirmed extension proposal, or composition,. under the
federal bankruptcy act of 1898, as amended, contributions then or thereafter due shall be entitled to such
priority as is provided for taxes in Section 64 of that act
(U. S. Code, Title 11, Chapter 7, Section 104, as
amended) .
as~ets

I

...AJternative Remedy-\Y/arrant to Sheriff-Execution.
·· (e) In addition and as an alternative to any other
remedy provided by this act and provided that no appeal
or other proceeding for review pro.vicled by this act
shall then be pending and the time for the taking thereof shall have expired, the commission or its. authorized
representative may issue a warrant in. duplicate, under
its official seal, directed to the sheriff of any county of
the state, commanding him to leVy upon and sell the
real and personal property of a delinquent ·-.~mployer
found \vi thin his county for the payment of. the contribution due thereon, with the added penalties, 1nterest
and costs, and to return such warrant to the commission
and pay into the fund the money· collected by virtue
thereof by a tin1e to be therein specified, not· more than
sixty days from the date of the warrant. Iintncdiately
upon receipt' of said warrant ·in duplicate, the sheriff
shall file the duplicate with the· clerk·. of· the district
court in his county, and thereupon> the cler-k-:.~hall enter
in the judgment docket,· in· the colutnn for judgment
debtorsl' the nan1e of the delinquent employer. mentioned
. in the warrant, ~d in app.ropriat~ column~ .the amount
. ·-~1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. of 'the 'contribution, 'penalties, interest and. costs, for
·which the warrant is issued ·and the date when such
duplicate is file~, and thereupon the amount of such
\Varrant SO' docketed shall have the force and effect of
an execu~ion against all persol}al· property of the delinquent emplqyer and shall also become a lien upon the
·real. p~operty of the de~i~quent employer in. the same
manner and to the same extent as a judgment duly
rendered by any district court and· docketed in the office
of the clerk thereof. The sheriff shall thereupon proceed upon the san1e in all respects, with like effect, and
inthe same manner as is pr~scribed by law with respect
to execution issued against property upon judgments
of a court of record, and shall be· entitled to the sar. 1e
fees for his services in executing the warrant, ~o be collected in the same manner.
''Contributions a Lien-Purchaser Liable for Same.

"(f)

Contributions imposed by this act shall be a lien
· upon the property of any employer liable for such contribution herein required to be collected who shall sell
out his business or stock of goods or shall quit business,
if such employer shall fail to make a final report and
payment on the date subsequent to the date of selling or
.quitting business on which they are due and payable as
prescribed by the commission. His successor, suc.cessors
or assigns, if any, shall be required to withhold sufficient
of the purchase money to cover the amount of such
contributions herein required to be collected and interest
or penalties due and payable until such time as the
former owner shall produce a receipt from the commission showing that they· have been paid or a (ertificate
stating that no amount· is due. If the purchaser of a
business or stock of goods shall fail to \vithhold suffic.ient purchase money as above provided, he shall be
personally liable for the payment of the amount of the
contributions herein .required to. be paid by the former
12
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O\vner ~ · interest a:nd- pen.alties ac~r\l~d. and .u.n paid by. the
fonner o\vner, owners or assignp.rs. :·"'!}{· ·h:a:·
t(DelinqU:eticy-Notice to Parties Holding ·Assets of
Employer.
tt

(g} in the event that any en1ployer i{ delinquent in

· ·. the payment .of any co~tribution herein required to be
.Paid by h_in1 the coJ?n1ission may give notice of the
~unount of such delinquency by registered mail to a,ll
persons having in their possession or ~der ·their control, any credits or other personal property belonging to
such employer, or O\ving any debts to ·such employer at
the time of the receipt by them of such notice· and thereafter any person so notified shall. neither tr.ansfer nor
n1ake any other disposition of ~uch credits, ,other personal property, or debts until the ·commission 'shall have
consented to a transfer or disposition, or· until twenty
days shall have elapsed from and afte~ the receipt of
such notice. All persons so notified· must, wtthin five
days after receipt of such notice, advise the; com1nission
of any and all such credits, othe!' .p~rsonal property or
debts in their possession, under their control or O"Vving
by them, as the case may be."
'

~

The court's attention is called to the fact. that the 1941
amen~ents

deleted from the law any mention of .'"be State
Tax Commission and placed entire responsibility for··· the· deter~ination of amounts due and the collection of those an10unts

in the hands of the Industrial Conunission of. Utah. Ir, consolidating all of the functions of the integrated, unemployn1ent
compensa.tion program in the Ind~striaJ Commi~sion, the legis-

.'. E~t~r~ .:m+gh~ ;w.~li h~v~ .c9 nsid~t;~.~l the similarities ,of. the program.to the program of.Workmen's Compens~lio~.~.:
The . statute·~· declared in Secti6n'2 was
-,

.'J.~;:.,

'

•'

~.~~·:.

~.'.

·_

';

•. ·

,:

"enacted
under the
~L.'"..

'

"-

.··

pqlice
po,vers .q£
.th.~ stat~,. S(ftting fo_rtl:.fln .,un~~plqyment com.
. ··•
-.
.
'.. . . . ' . -- ·-·
.

.

-~

-

.

.

-

'

'

.. -

.
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: pensation: system which, .in ·-so -far a-s· the public funds· of the
·-state a-re-concerned~·is self.:financing.. Under the Act..Scc ..(9)
an ((unemployment compensation-fund" is established and administered separate and apart from all public monies or funds
of the state~
. The· fund consists of. all contributions collected ·under the
·Act, and the Industrial Commission· is vested with full power,
authority and jurisdiction over the fund. Contributions are
deposited in the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund and are
requisitioned therefrom by the Industrial Commission, ( througl1
the State Treasurer, acting as its fiscal agent), from time to
time in such amounts as it deems necessary for anticipated
·benefit. payments. When so requisitioned such monies are re.quired to be deposited in the unemployment compensation fund
iri a·spe~ial benefit account and benefits are to be paid there. from in accordance with such regulations as the Industrial
·Commission may prescribe.
While there are some dissimilarities between the unem. ployment compensation program and the Workmen'.> Compen.sation program, th9se dissimilarities are not such as would
make an analogy inapplicable. The legislature might well have
considered the two laws similar in that the employer instead of
paying a. percentage of his payrolls to a corporation, insurance
company or the state fund, pays a percentage of his payrolls to
,t})e unemployment co~pensation fund. This fund pays a benefit for unemployment which actually .arises out of. the employ
:· rrienfi~· that an individual's benefits are based upon his earnings
·-for e111.ployers .. Under the ~mployrrierit Security Act, Section 7,
·the ~p:xploy~.r'~ rate has a <lirect relati9n_ to his payr_oH .experience.

14
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-(ertainly ~.both~ 1--a.~~ .were.- enacted as a ·p.rQp~r ..exereise ·of :the
legislature's police power .. Perhaps the legislature h.ad JP mind
the· t\vo-fold purpose of the act; that is, the detern1ipation of
'vhat individuals are eligible for benefits and what ~mployers
are required to pay contribution to sustain the fund .

. As pointed out in the National Tunnel~ Mines case, supra,
by Justice Wolfe, the legislature may have felt th.a.t "Yhere the
fact of "employment" is found for the purpose of deter1Ilining
benefits, it should also be binding as to the question of dete_rmination of ucontributions." Justice Wolfe cite~. the follO\Ving examples:

"Y makes application for benefit payments· naming X
as his (employer.' · X is found by the Industrial Commission not to be an employer within the. Act. .. The
applicant appeals. The Supreme Court sustains the
finding of the Industrial Commission.· 'The Tax Commission, nevertheless, sues X for (contributions.' · The
trial court, if \\ e assume tha it is_ not. bound in the tax
case by the decision of the Supreme Court, in the appeal
from the Industrial Commission, may find for the Tax
Con1n1ission. The matter .is appe~l_ed: t9. the Supr~_me
Court, \vhich is then confronted with the n~cessity of
passing on the correctness of its former. decision. Or
take the opposite situation where the ·Industrial Commission finds -that X is an 'employer' within the ~eaning
of the Act. The employer appeals~ The Suprem~ ~qurt
reverses. But the Tax Commission, on the theory that
this question is not at rest, sues for ·contributions.·
The district ·court finds fot X;: so the Tax Co1ntnission
appeals to the Suprerne Court.. Various awkward ·situ.. · a~ions. may J?y Jll~ reader be c~:u1:ceived.c - Jhe. s~he~1e
of_ the .1-\ct se~ms indubit_ab,ly ~o point to the purpose ~f
'
_, requiring· those 'erriployers' ·whose 'employees:' · are
:.· .. ~-L··~; ·_,
granted benefits· to contribute~ to, the-~ fund·. · One -niay
7

.,... 15
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/ , ·..

~'>

.

well conceive, . too; of a situation where one. applicant's
·cas~ :vvollld_:·b~>~ test J~r )J)ap.y m9re_in like :pgsit\9n.
If. .tl1.e Indu~_trial Com.mi$SiQ1l may ..be s~re tp:~t .~he
appeal -to· this. court from its findings· as to that applicant will· set the question at rest, it will be guided by
_th~ decision i!-1 said appeal in d(;!t~rmining the question
of benefits for the entire class. · There is some· chance
',at 'least
oht'ain in··such ptbceedirigs· ·~f decision ·of
this court before the fund is depleted by many payments
.to aleged employees whose alleged 'employers' need
not contribute _. . .

to

"Where one of two constructions of the law would
render an Act unworkable, or only haltingly workable,
or would fail to effectuate the obvious intent of the
legislature, and another construction, equally or nearly
. as feasible, ·would bring opposite results, it is our duty
to adopt the latter. I see nothing in logic or precedent
that requires us to accept the construction of the main
opinion. This is a case in which we are dealing with
t~e adrnin}stration of a public act designed to benefit
a' 'class· and society as a whole by cushioning the effect
of unemployment . . . . "
· The' Industrial· C,:ommission, through its Department of
· Employment Security, acting pursuant to the provisions of Section 14(b), determined that the plaintiff in this case .had paid
''wages for employment" and so notified the plaintiff, making
. d~p:1and for payment thereof. The plaintiff appealed to the
· Appeals Referee as provided in Section 10 of the Act, and the
Referee, after modifying the amounts due, affirmed the decision
of the:) .Commission~ representative.· l'he plaintiff, appealed,
pursthint to the provisions of Section 10, from the decision of
·-(he Appeats: 'Tribunal, asking that that._"decision be reviewed
by the l~du~trial Corpmission. ; It _i's Jr9m. t4e aff~r~_ing decision
~16
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of the .Industrial Cor.nn1ission that- this appeal \vas taken to
--this court. .r\ detern1inat~on by this court will have the effect
-·.6£ fixing hot only· benefit rights but the ·contri?ution liability
_of the employer.
·
In each step in the proceedings the Commission has fol. lowed the express outline of the statute ..and has acted entirely
'vithin the limits of the authority outlined therein.

II.
THE Il\:TIIVIDUALS ENGAGED IN MINING COAL
WERE PERFORMING SERVICES ttiN EMPLO..fMENT'.,
FOR THE PLAINTIFF FOR ttWAGES.''
Section 42-2a-19 (j) ( 1) and 19 (j) ( 5) (Utah Employ~
Inent Security Act) contain definiti<;>ns of e~ploy~eht as follows:

.. (j) ( 1)

'Employment' means any service performed
prior to j-anuary 1, 1941, which was employment as defined in the Utah Unetnployn1ent Compensation Law prior
to the effective date of this act, and subject to the other
provisions of this subsection, service performed a_fter
December 31, 1940 ,including service in· interstate
commerce, and service as an officer of a corporation
performed for wages or under any contract . of hire
\vritten or oral, express or implied."
(j) ( 5) Services -performed by -an :individual for
. _\vages or un4er any .contract of hir~, :w_rit~~n. 9!: ~>ral,
express or_implied, shall be dee~~d t.o be. emplqyn::~nt
subject to- this act unless arid uritil_ it is sho,v-il·' to the
·-- · ·- -~ .satisfaction -of the Commission ,that-··.·- .- · -.., · · -:·.<!: u
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· ·:\~.;~-· ·!'i:~v/. ':{A)::1.;1 :Such' jndividual:·:has, '::been :··arid·· w.ill LOhtinue
-~±0-h,e. free· £ro1n. tqn;trol:.orcdirection ~o.ver _·the-.per(orm-

. :~~·.r?(~ . -.;~

. ance' of such. services,. both under :his ·.contract of hire
:~rd-in f~ct~.-_arid .

-·

is either outside the~ US~Jal COUrse
•. of-the business for which su<:h servic;:f! js performed or

,,

:-~ ( :6)

..

.. suc9

S~rvice

; that such service is perf<?rmed outside of all the places
of ·busin~ss of the enterprise 'for which such service is
·performed; ··and
(C) such individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession,
or business of· the same nature as that involved in the
contract of service."
cc

Section 42-2a-19(h) (2) of the Utah Employ1nent Security ,A,t provides:
2) · ·. Each-· individual employed to perform or to
assist in performing the work of any person in the ser. vice· of an· employing unit shall be deemed to be en. ·gaged by ~uch employing unit for all the purposes. of
this act whether such individual was hired or paid directly by such employing unit or by such person, provided
-~~e :employing unit had actual or constructive knowl~dg~ of the work."
Cl (

In ·several cases. decided by this court prior to 1943 this
cqurt upheld the .theory that the aforementioned provision

'va.s intended to be broader in scope than the con1mon la·w
t_est of master and servant.

In the case of Singer Sewing

·Machine Company vs. Industrial Commission, et al, 104 Utah
'175~

-13'4' P. 2nd 479, decided in 1943, this court ~et out in
·_aetail't~e- principles and applicati~ri of th~ above-qu6te~1 section
.:

..

r_

I~-

.J.

. •

,!

•

•

.;,

~-

•

,

as the court saw it, .and we quote:-

·.

•

-

->

,

·

<;;__;-~r)c. ->·· UThe: examination ·,of :these . opinioas _.reveals J-hat the
·-'.s :;_

1nen1ber-s of this -court are CQtnmitte.d. to the following:
18
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\\~a)

The unemployment compensation law was en·
.. ·acted under and as an exercise of .the police po\ver
of the state ..
(b) Its purpose is remedial to protect the health,
morals, and "'elfare of the people by prov1ding a
cushion against the shocks ·and rigors of unemployment.
H

·'

'' (c) Being remedial under the police power and not
imposing limitations on basic rights, it should be
liberally construed.
'' (d) tEmployment' under the act is not confined to
conunon law concepts, or to the relationship of master
and servant, but is expanded to embrace all services
n:ndered for anothe1' Jor wages.
,. (e) The terms 'employment,' 'personal services' and
\vages' are n1uch broader in meaning and application
than their common lav; counterparts, and encompass
in their coverage many persons and relationships not
included in the common law relationship~£ master and
servant.
" (f) All situations where one rendering services for
another for 'wages' is under the direction and control
of such other in the rendering of such service, are
service relationships \Vi thin Sec. 19 (j) ( 1) of the act.

"(g) The absence of direction and control does not
necessarily exclude the parties, or the relationship from
the operations or scope of the act. ~.

'

.. -~

:~

.. (h) In determining if the relationship is within the
act, .the Commission and the court will look behind
the contract to the actual situation-.the status in which
the parties an~ placed by the r~latiol1ship tha{ -~xisls hetWeen then1.
·
··

.. (i)

The test is twofold: ·Did he. ·render personal
. _ser.vtce for .. another ? If so, -wa£ .he c·entitled to ·re~19
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:_i(:.r· ;- ,. ·_m.uneration ('Y'-ages )- therefor?-- . If ~both a:re found, the
-_,..,_.,,,
• relationship.i$ Wit!Jin the_ act._ i':.-..' _.:_, L. ·:)~ . · .-.:_ .. _ ..
·~·(j-) ,.Jf the .relationship -is w.ithi.ri the ~ct,; w~ apply
Section . 19 ( j) ( 5) to '; peteFp1.iP.e t_f b~_~ ts ~nntl!ed __t_o
benefits, . 'proyide? t~e cl.aio:ant :fl!~~~t~:. ~11 oth~r. re, . quirehlents 'of the act to -~ring him wt'thtn ttS pr?VlSIOn's.
--i'
. . ,.·
'.
'
' ., __ ,._' ' -.,
·· (k)__ Section 19(j) (5) is an exception~section taking
· · ·-or sifting out frorri the right to· receive benefits, certain
- persons who otherv1ise come within the act, as ·rendering per~on~l services for v1age~' and is not a test to determine. whether the relationship was a service one."
!

)

''

•

'

•

I

' Under this s~n1mary, then, we are confronted with a tvlo.fold prop/em: ( 1) _Were t~e individuals in question perfo:1111ng "persol).al services" for "v1ages" for the plaintiff; and ( 2)
·j( the reiations~ip__ was one of the performance of personal
.services for ";ages,- has the employer satisfied a'tl- three of the
:exclusion tests which are provided in Section 19 (j) ( 5) (a),
(b). & ·-(c) ~
)

'

.

.

1.-- It is apparent that the relationship which exrsted be-

tween_Powel1 and the so-called lessees involved in this matter
--~~s in its very ·essen~e a service -relationship. In 1944 the
plaintiff ~i.1tered ,into an oral agreement with one Jim Cruthis
(Tr. 5) u'nderwhich Cruthis was to be paid $1.50 p<:r ton of
coal "delivered in the bins." Out of this $1.50 Cruthis was to
'pay for' or otherwise .reimburse the plaintiff' for' the po\vder
.-and.·;ca-ps, used in mining the coal so delivered. This \vork
was to· be )perform-ed in a mining. property owned by the plaintiff's :wife which bad been -developed in the beginning ~prunarily
by ,-the efforts of the plaintiff .himself.. On the :dther. hand~ the
·.plain:tif£; Powell, .agreed fl!rnish the- rock dust, timber, '.rails,
tuel. oil,_ .horses, feed .· for the horses;. h()using, etc. .

to

2.0
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~-lost

of the _coal .which was n1ined in. this early period

\·;as, under the direction of Po~:ell, sold to truckers who loaded
their trucks directly from the mining bins. Whenever Cruthis
1eceived money from the sale of this coal, he turned the entire
umount oYer to Po,vell, except that at certain times he withheld
for hitnself $1.50 per ton. 1-1here is no showing that at any
tin1e Cruthis \Vas actually given a definite legal interest in the
mining property itself (which, as we have stated before, \Vas
o\vned by the plaintiffs \vife) ; likewise, he obtained ao legal
title to the coal \vhich was mined. His duties were (Onfined
to those of digging coal and placing it in the bins and at times
acting as Po,velr s agent in selling the coal to truck~rs. The
tonnage which \Vas placed in t~e bins by Cruthis merely acted
~s a measure of the total amount of remuneration ·which he
\vas to receive,
Following Cruthis there was a succession of individuals
,;.·ho entered into similar agreements with the plaintiff whereby
they agreed to mine the coal and place it in the bins. The
'~rrangement with reference to the furnishing of powder and
caps and all the other material and equipment was substantially the sarne as that provided in the arrangement with Cruthis.
As the production of coal increased, Powell entered into
cral agreements with certain truck owners who agreed to haul
the coal from the mine to the railroad for shipment to plaintiffs custotners. It is of interest to note that the fluctuations
tn the price of the coal had no effect on the per-ton. rate paid
to the individuals mining the coal and placing it in rhe bins.
lrom time to time Powell engaged certain of these miners to
install stoppings. and paid them $35.00 for each .stqpping so
.21
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·:installed.;·•Lln addition;·, he· paid :the··miners for. the: work·.they
pe'rformed in .loading the.: t.cucks :.from the: bins .. -';._'::l: .di:X·~- :~on
11

-1 ... \

.... '

.

-~·

J .•

..

b

... :·: ;

t

. . .

.

.

: . '

. .'

,~ ... ,

.....

\.1·~ ~

\:

. In 't946 ·o·Neil ·and Sons entered into ari oral agreement
t '
,~1th- Powell to perform~ the·' service of mining the coal. aqd
placing it in the bins. The arrangement with the O''Neils
\Vas the . san1e as had· .previously existed :with Cruthis_ and the
others except that after the work had started -the oral agreen1ent
".vas -reduced to writing in an agreement dated September 5,
1946. (Appellant's Exhibit No. A). While the written agrecrnent is silent as to ~anything which will be required of the
plaintiff except the payment of $1.50 per ton for coal delivered
in the bins· at- the mine, the working arrangement provided that
a.ll operating materials, equipment, and power other than
powder and caps was to be furnished by Powell. In -:h1s connection, it is interesting to note that all of the operating
pern1its used in· connection with the mining of coal at the
n1ine and the selling of the coal which was produced were
in the plaintiff, Powell's, name. This included, · of course,
--the/ Workmen's . Compensation policy, which the ONeils
demanded be taken out, the permit to buy powder and caps,
sales tax 1 license, etc.
· •· · '

>' 'i i

., I ·~

I

.

\.'.•.'1• •..

' • ·.

.

.

'' :

·-,

. '.. " 1

~

I•

'

• ,

.

'

.,

!

• : •

·

:

. •

:

.

'

,. -. ·: Richard O'Neil testified that while Powell didn't do the
·actual work, he did a lot of directing. The record shows that
d~~ing the period the O'Neils were .mining coal, Po,vell \vas
at the mine during a major percentage of the time, and Powell
personally operated the tipple while two of the O'~..Jeils· Joaded
coal during parts of ·that ~time~ The ·O~Neils · testified that
-:when,he . would ;.'catch up'' with the O'Neils, who were loading
coal, Jre~ toq., would ,-load coal (this loading being £1on1 :the
.2.2
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b1ns· into the trucks. as previously mentioned). The record is
not entirely clear as to '"hy the O'Neils terminated t.heir mining
activities but the reason given by Richard O'Neil was that it
\vas terminated because of "disagreeable working conditions.
\\"e couldn't seem to agree with Mr. Powell."
After the O'Neils terminated their services, Powell entered
into· a contract with Eln1er Babcock and LeRoy Sa£] ey. Under
this agreen1ent, the so-called lessees agreed to keep the said
n1ine in ttcontinuous production unless the same is closed for
reasons beyond their control . . . " (Appellant's Exhibit No.
B) . The lease was to run until such time as the plaintiff,
Powell, obtained ancl installed a Joy-Loader at the mine at
\vhich tin1e the parties agreed to renegotiate the contract.
Under the agreen1ent the lessees, Babcock and Safley, agreed
to produce and deliver a minimum of 200 tons of coal per
day in the bins in the said mine, and the lessor agreed to accept
the coal and to put the bins in such condition as to receive the
same. In remuneration for this service Powell was to pay
the "lessees,, the sum of $1.50 per ton for such coal delivered
tn the bins.
Payn1ent was to be made twice each month;
uamely, on the lOth and 25th.. The contract further provided
that Babcock and Safely were to operate on a six-day week
and would be excused therefrom only in the event of strike,
'let of God, etc. Any violation of the provisions gave the lessor
the right to· retake possession of the mine.
Shortly after operations started under the agreen1ent. be. tween Powell and .Babcock and Safley, the state mine inspector
visited the mine and ordered Powell to install a. certified mine
foreman. . As a result of this order, Powell engaged one Har2.3
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\\'Ood to act -a.s-: forernai1, and as .foreman. Harwood directed
·the-~~he~operatioiis~_~.-.It_inust'be rioted that Appellant's Exhibit
No~ B- gives no 1nd1catio.tl that Harwood- ever b,ecame a party
·to the contractAs :rnjne _operations_ expan~ed~ Powell added such things
~iS. cutti~1g machine~, a .locomotive, generator, scale~, etc. After
the scales were installed, the men were required to keep weigh
slips on any coal sold to truckers and to turn the slips over to
Powell _t~g~ther _with any money collected from the truckers.
l)uring a great proportion of this latter period Powell hirnself
\vas engaged in hauling coal from the mine to the ~ailroad.
PowelL_ was requ~red by the State Tax Commission ro report
and pay sales tax. on any coal he sold to consumers.

-It is obvious from the testimony and other evidence that the
several individuals e~gaged from time to time under variou;;
~ greements, oral and written, were engaged to perform a service measured at $1.50 per ton. It is obvious that these individuals were not in business to make a profit inasmuch as
their remuneration did not vary with the increase in the sales
price of the coa.l. It is also clear that Powell at all times retained legal title t9 and actual possession of the coal itself.
In this court's decision in the case of Combined Metals
Reduction Company, et al, vs. Industrial Commission of Utah,
101 Utah,230; 116 P-. 2d 929, this court said, in discussing the
-relationship. between the IClessee'' and Combined :rvfetals Re-duction Company {in many respects similar by its terms to the
in~ta~t:_ ~ase)_:
-· nThe determination of whether the contract in this case
· was· in -reality a· lease or. actually gave rise to a service

24
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relationship n1ust be arrived at by an actual analysis of
the provisions of the so-called lease and the conduct
uf the parties under it, which task I now undertake.
In doing this I shall cornpare the provisions (iS far as
possible \vith those of the {lease' which we had before
us in the case of National Tunnel & Mine Company
vs. Industrial Commission, supra. We find in this
(lease' provisions similar to those in the National Tunnel CJ.se. The lessee shall work the n1ine in good and
miner-like fashion ( 1) ; shall not employ or bring on
the premises any persons objectionable to the lessor;
shall supervise the \\·!ork personally ( 3) and assist in
the performance thereof; shall work a certain number
of shifts; shall not sub-lease without lessor':> consent
( 2); shall pay tramming, smelting and hauling charges;
( 3) ; shall not obstruct main openings ( 2) nor stow
\\' aste underground except on lessor's consent ( 2) ;
shall allow track and loading chutes to remain at the
termination of the agreement; and shall allow Company
agents to enter, inspect, survey and take samplings
o f ore. ''
In the instant case the lessor's right in the product mined
was similar to the right of the company in the National Tunnel
case in that there never was a point during the operation
wherein the ((lessee" had any legal title to the coal which \vas
rnined. The court pointed out in the definition cont::uned in
40 C.J. p. 991, Section 585:
''There is a broad distinction between the lease of a
mine in 'vhich the lessee enters into possession and
takes an estate in the property and a license to work
the same mine, in that in the latter case the licensee
has no permanent interest, property or estate in the
land itself, but only in the proceeds, and in such proceeds not as a reality, but as personal property, and
his possession is the possession of t!'Ie own~r, and in

.25
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i-, .. - _t,):~~;.

-dete~·minirig~·whether·-a· particular.inst.rument :is.a

lease

,~·_,,· ,"_ ·:~;·1 Qf:·a lic_ense, co11sideratio1_1 should-.b~ give~:'(o wh~~her
tbe,·: grantee acquires ap. ~stat~ ip. the. l_and; whet_her the
"f c,~t
;p ··

consideration -is for :the entir·e·- ·subject co-nveyed by
'title~- and whether the contract ·contains any ·words of
grant or demise."

, ,.f~1.~ .court· £u.rther illustrated._ the agreement in e1e Com-

_,p.ined _l\1etals c~se, supra, by stating:
'

,

'.

"The 'lessee' in this case obtained little more than property interest than does a sh'l,re cropper. In .fact in sorne
·respects he seems not to be in as good a position as a
share cropper because his tenure may be cancelled
without cause before he discovers or garners a crop.
· He is universally recognized as a worker who receives
a share of the crop as his wages. If there is no crop,
he receives no wages, much as in a mining lease if
there is no pay ore mined the (lessee' receives no wages.
There is such a thing as a lease of farm lands with provision that" the rent payable shall be a share of the
crop raised. But in determining whether · a contract
is one· for labor payable· in kind, or a lease with the
... rent payable in kind, the very factors which \Ve have
.d~scussed above are controlling. The courts inquire
into the question of the owners right to direct the
farmers performance; whether he has the right to come
on the farm at will; whether he has the right at harvest
.to take the crop and divide; or '\vhether the farmer has
the custody o.f it and may do the dividing. If it appears .by contract or in fact that the owner had the
, :·,<·:;
·right of entry, at will, not only to see that there was
'::' :1 ~r_;
no waste'~ -and that the· occupant was ·conducting· the
,_·.-{ .,_,
operations .in a business-like manner, but .to direct_ the
(..l . _,_._,··. ; rpann~r; .rn~~ns and method of performance, it is_ h.eld
. that the occupanf is·' a farin laborer ori share and not
- ····.:;·'·a tenant·on· share:''

26
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In the instant case as the court stated in the Combined
1\letals Case, supra, the Hlease·, \Vas a n1eans and instrumentality
to accomplish the business purposes of the plaintiff, Po\vell.
It cannot be said to have transferred to the several individuals
the possesion or interest in a piece of land for their independent
operation. It \vas definitely a part of the business of the
plaintiff, Po\vell, and a method of its accomplishment. Also
111 the instant case the so-called Hlessees, had no actual title
or interest in the premises, (indeed there may be some question
0£ Powell's rights (since he did not own the property) to
transfer an interest in the property). Rather these individuals
were engaged to perform but one function in the entire operation of the plaintiff, Powell. It must naturally be acknowledged
that the business of mining coal consists not only of digglng
the coal out of the ground and placing it in the bins, but also
consists of the handling and sale of the coal after it is in the
b1ns, including the transportation to railroad and purchasers,
etc. Powell, himself, carried on generally the entire business
uf the selling of the coal and delivering the same to the market.
It was his coal when it was in the ground, it was his coal when
it was in the bins, and remained his coal until actually delivered
to the customers.
While the testimony as to actual control tnaintained by
:Powell in directing the details of operations is rather sketchy, ,
~t is apparent that in order to carry on a profitable business il
\vas necessary that Po,vell maintain at all times a control of the
entire operation.

It appears that when the individuals \vho

'"ere doing the work of digging coal ceased to perform as
Powell saw fit, these individuals were repla~e~ by vthers .
.2.7
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,._,':~:

'•. Section

'":~

,, c.'cP)

::.~_,;,_:

1~·

(p).:of'.the Act defines·:.wages·.as_:

''\o/ag~s::'k~iri~ all rerririiierati~i:i

.:<·.:_ :.:

·.:_ ....:.

toi' perSOnal

servic'es, in·chiding. commissions' and bonus·es: ·ai1d the
~:~t~J....r..- , cash vahre of all remuneration in any ~m·edium other
··t::o.:. (~1!.-.: . than_ cash.
Gratuitie,s_ custol;Ilarily received by an. in,.; .. ,:····J ~dividual in the.~ourse ~f. ~is e~plo_y~ent. from persons
..''~-'f;.l.~l ;,other than fiis employing' uhit shall be 'treated as 'wages
~--~~_,,. ·ll·~ received from his employing unit. The reasonable cash
_.;f.·:~~;:
value.' of remuneration in any medium other than cash
and the reasonable amount of gratuitic;:s shall be esti1
mated ~nd determined in accordance with rules pre, 'sc.dbed by the Commission; provided, that the tern1
'wages? shall ·not include:"
•

,· c·

.i,

. · Th~, individuals in question in this case were obviously

bei~g p~id ~ages 0~1 ~ piece-rate basis for the s~rvice of digging
the coal and placing· it in the bins. The $1.50 per ton which
was. p~id 'was remuneration for personal services, and the
.i)eisonal ~ervices. Vfe.re performed for Powell as a part of his
o~eraJl ·. c~al mining operations.
J.~j~

l·~

;,

.· . .

. .

.· ' ' .

.

Having~

found that there was a performance of serv1ees
for Powell for wages, we apply the next step in the formula
laid out by . this court in the Singer Sewing Machine Case~
supra, and ask whether or not the employer has satisfied the
a,:. b, c. exclusion provisions of Section 19 (j) ( 5). We think
that the employer has failed as regards all three of these exclusion tests. ( 1) He has failed to show that he did not
control or have the right to control the details of the operations
of the individuals in question; ( 2) the course of Po,vell· s
business included the entire ~oal mining operation Jnd included
:the dig.ging and :,placing of.th~ .coal in· the bins~ . . In additon,
the-;services of:_ the ·individuals :were ·.performed .. in. 1h.e.ir enc::.:i

28
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tuety at the place of business of the plaintiff, -Powell. _At no
place in the record appears any showing that the ''lessees" were
operating a business of their own or had any "course of business,; ( 3) there is no showing that any of the "lessees" were
customarily engaged in the independently established business
of operating coal mines. As a matter of fact, the work history
of most of these individuals 'vas that they had previously
been engaged in mining coal for other companies for \vages,
either for a salary or on a piece-work basis. They were not, in
any sense of the word, independent of Powell in their operations with him. They '"'ere merely operating under a license
\Yhereby they could go in the mine, blast the coal lo~se, pull
it out and place it in the bins. For this they received not a profit
~~inasmuch as they had at no time any right, title, or interest
in the coal itself other than possibly a lien for wages), but a
\vage computed on a piece-rate basis based on the tonnage
delivered into the bins. Their only method of increasing their
tncome as the result of their services was to work harder or
\vork longer hours. Whether the sales price for coal was
$3.50 or $7.50 per ton made no difference to them. The rate
of their compensation remained fixed throughout. In addition, their ·'license'' to work was contingent, among other
things, upon the number of shifts required by Powell under
the oral or \Vritten agreements.

III.
CONCLUSION
\VIe submit, therefore, that the Commission acted

\Vi thin

1ts duly constituted legal authority as outlined in the Employ-
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~ment

Security Act,- ·Chapter 42-:2a, Utah Code Annotated ·.1943,
as amended. We .submit further that the- determination of the
Commission is fully supported by the record and the testimony
in this case.· In fact, there is no evidence to support any other
finding. . We respectfully request, therefore, that the decision
of the Industrial Commission be affirmed.
Respectfully . .submitted,

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT:
CLINTON· D. VERNON,
Atto1'ney General

FRED F. DREMANN,
Special Assistant. Attorney ..
·General
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